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IMPORTED INFLATION, GLOBAL PRICE CHANGES AND ECONOMIC 
CRISES IN TANZANIA 1970-1982
(Notes ^ Toward An Outline)
A I
Introduction
1. Economic Structure
. Least Developed 1981 GDP £150/capita
. Moderate Growth 1971-1981 4.5% (Agriculture 3.5 to 4%)
. Structurally Open Exports + Imports over 50% GDP 1960's.
. Structurally Closing (?) To 35% GDP 1980's 
. No Domestic Oil/Substantial Hydro/Wood Fuel
2. Political Economy
. Public Sector Dominant Large and Medium Scale 
. Performance Uneven
. Stress on Domestic Economic Integration 
. Expansion Basic Services Access 
. Reduction Income Differentials
. Managed Market (i.e. not Material Balances) Planning 
. Fiscal Conservatism (high tax variant)
. No Export Strategy or Policy (Pro or Con)
1967-1972
3. Economic Run-up to 1973/75 Crisis
. Institution Political Economic Model (as at 2)
. Strengthening Institutional/Personpower Bases 
. Industrial/Agricultural Performance
. Export Performance (Moderate Worsening Terms of Trade/ 
Volume Near Stagnation)
. Crisis Management 1970-72 (Basically To Weak External 
Cash Flow, Domestic Credit Expansion Policy - Successful) 
. Inflation up from 4-5% late 60's to 10% early 70's 
(Parallel to World Shifts)
1973-1975; The First Crisis
4. Causal Factors
. 1973 and 1974 Bad Harvests (Basically Weather/Beginning 
Altered Weather Cycle)
. 1972 Grain Price Explosion (And Domestic Real Grain Price 
Cuts on Fund/Bank Advice)
. Massive 1974, 1975, 1976 Grain Imports
(NB: never long term grain surplus, tendency to swings 
from import to, smaller, exports of maize, deficit to 
balance rice, deficit wheat) - No starvation 
. 1973-1974 Oil Price Increases (oil from 6% to 20% of 
export earnings) - No physical shortages 
. General import price increases - offset 1973 (which 
was on face of it good external balance year but mis­
leadingly so) but not 1974, 1975 by export price increases
5. Policy Response
. Rapid - Coordinated
. Passed on New World Price Levels (COL 40% leap 3rd
Quarter 74 to 2nd Quarter 75, then back to 8-10% a year).
. Energy policy one of pushing hydro for electricity, fully 
passing on cost of oil increase, holding oil taxes about 
constant real terms, altering ratio of product prices in 
favour of illuminating kerosene, motor diesel and against 
gasoline
. Strict control domestic credit/foreign exchange 
. Maintenance basic services/fixed investment momentum 
. Minimum Wage and Grower Price for Basic Food Increases 
(Order of 50%)
. Interim Grain/Sugar Subsidies Phased Out by November 1974 
(paid over to marketing bodies in 1974/75 from recurrent 
revenue).
. General Tax Increases (Gladstonian Bias i.e. Beer/Cigarettes) 
. In Principle Selective Import Substitution/Export Production 
Development
6. Results
. One Year Low Growth (Then Recovery)
. Turn around Food Production Growth Plus Improved Procurement 
(Leading Major Surpluses 76-77-78)
. Recurrent Budget Remained In Balance (Just) 74/75 Then 
Returned to Surplus 
. Bank Borrowing 74/75 At Target Of 25% Addition to Bank 
Deposits Plus "Non Fiscal Inflation" Currency Circulation 
Increase Then Fell Below
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. Reduction Real Wage And Especially Salary Incomes/
Peasant Income Trend Real Terms Subject Of Debate 
. Overall 1975-81 Domestic Barter Terms Trade Peasants 
Up (But Down For Industrial/Export Crops)
. Volume Fall In Exports (No Actual Implementation This 
Aspect of 1974 Programme)
. Investment (Especially Industry) Maintained But 
Increasing Completion Lag 
. 40% Compression Imports/GDP ratio (excluding grain) 
in "Quantity" Terms 
. Successful Use IMF (SDRs, Gold And First Credit Tranches, 
Compensatory and Oil Facilities), IBRD Programme (Import 
Support) Loan, Bridging Finance. No Commercial Arrears 
Or Defaults
1976-1978 Recovery And Run-up Second Crisis
7. Performance
. 5% Plus GDP Growth 
. 1976-77 Beverage Price Boom
. 1977 Record Recurrent Budget Surplus And Record External 
Reserves
. Record Food Surpluses (Leading to Major Domestic Credit, 
Inflationary Pressure, Physical Handling, Marketing Board 
Viability Problems)
. Rapid Expansion Industrial Capacity (Relatively Low Direct 
Import Content) And Output 
. Import And Remittance Liberalisation (Gradual late 75 - 
mid 77; Massive on Fund/Bank Advice mid 1977)
8. Underlying Weakness
. Assumption (a la McCraken) World Economy Back To 1970-72 
Pattern
. Masking Of Underlying Structural External Imbalance By 
Beverage Boom
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. Unsustainable Import Liberalisation 
. Recurrent Budget Slide to Looseness (Masked By 
Beverage Boom Related Windfall Revenue)
. Still No Export Strategy Nor Export Growth
1979-1982 Deepening Crises
9. Causal Factors
. Second Petroleum Price Explosion (20% to Over 40%
Export Earnings For Oil Imports)
. Bad weather/Bad Procurement/Bad Storage Impact on 
Grain Import Requirements 
. Cost Amin Invasion And Consequences ($700 million)
. Terms Of Trade Collapse (Broad Agreement That To 
1977 = 100, 1982 Under 50 - Data Weak and Timing 
Disagreed)
. Lagged Reversal Import Liberalisation
. Attempt (1979-1980/choked off 1981) To Maintain Invest­
ment By Supplier Credits 
. Import Constraint On Manufacturing And Therefore Basic 
Tax Base (Sales Tax On Domestic Manufactures)
. Horrendous Performance Parallel Administration On 
Agricultural Price, Parastatal Supervision, Crop 
Target And Related Policy Front 
. Collapse Of Recurrent Budget Into Huge Deficit (5% GDP) - 
Revenue Erosion, Security Bills, Deficits Related to 
Agricultural Sector 
. Failure to Achieve Coordinated Policy Response 1979-80; 
Collapse First Attempts (1980 Fund/Bank Programme 
Centered) Because Too Optimistic Re Weather, World 
Economy, Speed Of Response; Continued Weakness (1981-82) 
Policy Coordination
10. Results
Continuing Recurrent Budget Deficit (Inflationary)
Export Cover Of Imports Down to 50%. Debt Service Ratio 
to 20%. Short Term Arrears 75% Annual Exports. In 
Default Some Debt, e.g. World Bank.
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. Import Constraint On Production Severe (1979-82 Fall 
Manufactured Output Of Order 35-40%) With Severe 
Multiplier Effect 
. Fuel Price Increases Pass On (But Tax Fall In Real 
Terms; But Also Sharp Rise in Public And Private 
Importing - Refining - Distribution Margins) - 25%
Fall 78-81 In Use - Physical Shortages - Partial 
Rationing
. Inflation From 8-10% a Year mid 1975 - mid 1978 to 35% 
1980/ 30% 1981/30% or More 1982 (Understates But Less 
Than Might Be Supposed)
. Erosion Public Services (Real Expenditure Including 
Defense/Deficit Cover Declined 1980/81, 1981/82, will 
do so 1982/83)
. Initial Export Emphasis As Priority (1980), Moves to 
Operational Strategy And Annual Plans (1981, 1982) - 
Limited Results. Two major projects: Paper and Natural 
Gas/Amonia/Urea pursued energetically but 1986 initial 
output and 1990's full impact (combined boost exports 
over 50%).
. Severe Fall Urban Real Incomes (Rural Mixed)
. Increasing Febrileness In Policy Implementation/Manage­
ment And Hesitancy Taking Basic Decisions (Since Any 
Decision Seemed Likely To Do Harm)
. Inadequate Maintenance Of Transport (etc.)
. Imminent Economic Collapse Danger By Mid 1982
Selected Policy Areas
11. Energy Policy
. Pricing 
. Allocation 
. Conservation
. Substitution (Hydro/Coal For Oil)
. Exploration (Build-up From 1970/Intensive From 1977)
. Wood (Basically Parallel Domestic Crisis Not Related 
To Global Evolution Except In Case Of Tobacco
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12. Import Dependence Reduction (Manufacturing)
. Basic Integrated Industrial Sector Strategy 
. Range Of Products 
. Import Content 
. Performance Level
. Mismatch Strategy Timing/Crisis Onset Timing
13. Agricultural Policy
. Relative/Absolute Price Incentives 
. Procurement 
. Storage/Transport 
. Financial Management
14. Price Management 
. Objectives
. Rural Price/Urban Wage 
. Food (Retail)
. Energy
. Domestic Manufactures 
. Exchange Rate
(Ineffectiveness In Face Major Structural Constraints)
15. Export Strategy
. Absence 1961-80 
. Price Component
. Profit Incentive Component (Direct And Indirect)
. Targetting (Agricultural/Other)
. Limitations - Policy
. Limitations - Base Export Mix (1 greyhound, 1 limping 
hound, 1 cancerous beagle, 4 one legged curs, 1 senile 
mastiff, i.e. cashew, coffee, tobacco, cotton, pyrethrum, 
sisal, tea, diamonds)
Forward Perspective
(Must Consider-Not Sure At Moment I Can Draw One Up That Is 
Possible And Subject To Systematic Present -)
Reginald Herbold Green 
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